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STATES OF EXCEPTIONALITY: PROVISIONAL DISABILITY, ITS 
MITIGATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Dr. Fiona A. Kumari Campbell**
In recent years, a number of common law jurisdictions in North America 
and Australia  have  delivered judgements,  which,  among other  things,  have  
challenged  traditional  formulations  of  impairment  and  legal  renderings  of  
disablement as existing independent of various technologies. In tandem with  
these legal re-writes, some neo-conservative legal writers have advocated for  
the  reformulation  of  impairment  along  the  lines  of  mitigated  disability in 
contradistinction  from  voluntary or  elective  disability –  which  denotes  the 
bodily  and/or  mental  states  of  those  who  ‘choose’  to  remain  disabled.  
Developments in surgical techniques and pharmacology have meant that it is  
possible  to  eradicate,  neutralise  or  morph  impairment  to  the  extent  that  
ontologically, the disabled person is transmogrified from an ‘impaired status’  
to  newly  fabricated  able-bodiedness.  Disability  constructed  under  these  
circumstances  can  be  figured  as  ‘tentative’  and  provisional.  This  paper  
discusses  these  developments  in  intolerance,  a  trend  which  implies  that  
impairment  as  impairment  is  intrinsically  negative  and  explores  what  the  
notion of  tentative  disability means to  the  understanding of  citizenship,  the 
productive body and the valuing of difference within neo-liberal societies. 
I. Projecting Disability? 
The focal concerns of this paper are part of a larger research charter which 
seeks to examine the ways that processes of ableism can be better understood 
and  subsequently  how  ableism  in  turn  produces  understandings  of 
disablement.1 This charter has two sites of interest that are addressed in this 
** Director,  Socio-Legal  Research Centre,  Griffith Law & the School  of  Human Services, 
Griffith  University,  Australia,  Adjunct  Professor,  Disability  Studies  Unit  University  of 
Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. 
1 See Fiona Kumari Campbell, Inciting Legal Fictions: 'Disability’s Date with Ontology and 
the Ableist Body of the Law',  10(1) GRIFFITH L. REV. 42 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell, 
Legal Fiction]; The Case of Clint Hallam’s Wayward Hand: Print Media Representations of  
the ‘Uncooperative’ Disabled Patient,  CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD., 
443  (2004);   Legislating  Disability:  Negative  Ontologies  and  the  Government  of  Legal  
Identities in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY, (Shelley Tremain 
ed., 2005) [hereinafter Campbell, 2005a]; Selling the Cochlear Implant,  25(3) DISABILITY 
STUD. Q., (2005); Litigation Neurosis: Pathological responses or rational subversion? 25(4) 
DISABILITY  STUD. Q.  (2006)  [hereinafter  Campbell,  Litigation  neurosis];  Exploring 
Internalised Ableism Using Critical Race Theory,  DISABILITY & SOCIETY  (2005); and 
Bernadette Baker & Fiona Campbell, Transgressing Noncrossable Borders: Disability, Law,  
Schooling  and  Nations in  VITAL  QUESTIONS  FACING  DISABILITY  STUDIES  IN 
EDUCATION 319 (Scot Danforth & Susan Gabel eds., 2006).
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paper, namely the site of technology and the site of law. More specifically, I 
am  interested  in  how  law  mediates  medico-technological  formulations  of 
impairment that become transmogrified and codified in law. 
Many years ago it was hard to imagine a scenario where disabled people 
would  be  coerced  into  obtaining  surgical,  prosthetic  or  pharmacological 
interventions in order to avail themselves of the limit pointed identity of the 
‘disabled person’, which inter alia, enabled them to access social services and 
legislative  protections.2 In  contrast,  what  is  also  difficult  to  imagine  is  a 
situation where the juridical authorities endorsed a reading of legal disability 
which in effect penalized disabled people who had taken steps, rightly or not, 
to mitigate their impairments – only to find out that such acts of mitigation rule 
them outside the purview of disability as defined under law.  Such imaginings 
are the source of this paper, which as the title suggests, probes the question of 
citizenship and impairment in its ‘untreatable’ state.
This paper is divided into four parts.  Part I contends that law operates as 
narrative  and  provides  an  outline  of  legal  baggage  and  backdrops.  In  this 
section  I  argue  that  an effective  method of  deconstructing  hegemonic  legal 
narratives  on  disability  is  to  deconstruct  the  spatial  assumptions  embedded 
within those narratives. The legal story-teller makes certain unconscious and 
implicit  choices regarding the spaces and places within which the narrative or 
story  unfolds.  And,  those  choices,  rather  than  being  neutral,  reinforce  a 
performative passion for sameness occluded by a deeply embedded notion that 
disability is inherently negative. Part II is concerned with the encounter of law 
with people with disabilities.  Here I argue that legal texts plays a complicitious 
role in authorizing particular representations of impairment and the permissible 
ways in which the disabled litigant has standing with the law.  Part III is a 
focused  discussion  on  the  matter  of  mitigation.  It  first  operates  at  the 
philosophical  level—in particular what  the  deployment of  this  concept says 
about the status of disability and the disabled person in civil society. Secondly, 
for  illustrative purposes I  survey legal  reasoning around the mitigation in a 
series  of US Federal  Court  cases.  Finally,  in  Part IV,  the substance of  the 
paper is drawn together in a consideration of the implications of the recent 
trend in case law and legal theory about mitigating impairment and the ways in 
which  disability  formulations  have  the  capacity  to  redefine  disability  as 
provisional or tentative.
2 Individuals may have been coerced for other reasons related to the ideology of cure or care.
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II. Legal Baggage and Backdrops
Law has traditionally had an ambivalent attitude towards disabled people, 
restricting  itself  to  being  an  arbiter  of  rules  and  to  policies  of  care  and 
protection.  A. V. Dicey enunciates that the rule of law and its enactment in 
common law constitutions is due to the rights of individuals enforced by courts, 
and not the other way around.3 A frequent motif in the literature on the rule of 
law is that the rule protects against the use of arbitrary power by governments 
against  individuals.  Constitutionalist  Joseph  Raz,  for  instance,  invokes  the 
trope  of  the  rule’s  curbing  of  power.4  Despite  this  insight,  Raz  raises  the 
pertinent  concern  about  the  elasticity  of  the  notion  of  arbitrary  power, 
concluding, “… many forms of arbitrary rule are complementary with the rule 
of law”5. One aspect of this paper’s focal concerns asks the question—does the 
trend toward representing disablement in terms of mitigation represent a slide 
towards the arbitrary use of power by government through the apparatus of 
law? The insights of legal geography have pointed to the intersection of law, 
space  and  power,  whereby  the  spatial  order  of  things  (political,  economic, 
ontological and cultural) are lived before they are recited and theorized. Legal 
texts invoke narratives that involve choices about which spaces and places to 
include and exclude. These spatial partitionings can mask and obscure power 
relations and power dynamics. Doreen Massey explains, 
Social space can helpfully be understood as a social product, as 
constituted out of social relations, social interactions. Moreover, 
precisely because it is constituted out of social relations, spatiality  
is always and everywhere an expression and a medium of power.6 
Thus, critical legal geographers, the ‘space invaders’7, contest the notion of 
neutral or empty space and point to the centrality of law as enacting spatial 
hierarchies.  Such  cartographical  dividing  and  partitioning,  John  Comaroff 
asserts exposes law as “the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the 
power of an alien state and part of the process of coercion ... [which became a] 
3 A.V. Dicey,  cited from T. BLACKSHIELD and G. WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & 
THEORY 105-106 (2002).
4 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 202 (1977).
5 RAZ, THE RULE 202 (1977). 
6 Doreen Massey, Space/Power, Identity/Difference: Tensions in the City, in THE URBANIZATION 
OF INJUSTICE 104 (Andy Merrifield and Erik Swyngedouw eds., 1997).
7 Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the ‘Third World’ in International law  
and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L . REV. 913 (2000).
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tool for pacifying and governing colonized peoples”.8 What role has law played 
in  the  colonization  of  disabled  people  in  asserting  the  rule  of  ableism? 
Certainly,  as  Thomas  Barton  points  out,  the  law  is  more  comfortable  in 
focusing on a singular place in the form of an individual person – case by case 
diachronically,  rather  than  in  interrogating  communally  inherited  beliefs 
synchronically. This has resulted in a process of decontextualization, whereby 
action is reduced to individual volition rather than being connected to context, 
history  and  legacies.9 This  topographical  denial  does  not  present  any  real 
difficulties and is quite in keeping with the common law tradition, which as 
Wesley  Pue  readily  points  out,  is  already  anti-geographical—deriving  its 
meaning  in  an  abstracted,  acontextual  way,  removed  from  the  spatially 
materialities in which it is contested.10 When courts construct legal doctrine and 
write judicial opinions, they do so by organizing and interpreting events and 
ontologies  of  personhood according  to  a  narrative  in  which  the  events  and 
characters  "relate  to  one  another  and to  some overarching  structure,  in  the 
context  of  an  opposition  or  struggle."11 The  elusive  nature  of  impairment 
(particular when lived out in a social context) and the problematical difficulties, 
in some instances, of forecasting prognosis, does not neatly fit with the law’s 
focus on rules, formulae and predictability. 
Legal responses to the challenges of disablement persistently demonstrate a 
performative passion for sameness.12 Not just any sameness, but paradoxically 
and deliberately a sameness underpinned by shifting constitutional divides that 
enact  an  ontological  separation  between  ‘abled’  and  ‘disabled’,  where 
‘mixtures’ are expiated through processes of fabrication and simulation.  The 
constitution of spatiality is an attempt to create order out of disorder (diversity 
and  difference)  through  a  process  of  purification—the  establishment  and 
demarcation of distinct ontological zones (disabled/abled, human/nonhuman), 
and through a process of translation that acknowledges the reality of mixtures, 
or as Latour puts it, makes visible the effort “… to extirpate ourselves from 
8 John Comaroff, Symposium Introduction: Colonialism, Culture and the Law: A Forward, 26 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305,306 (2001).
9 Thomas Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47(1) 
EMORY L.J. (1998).
10 Wesley Pue,  Wrestling with Law: (Geographical) Specificity vs.  (Legal) Abstraction,  11 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 566 (1990).
11 Patrick Ewick & Susan Sibley,  Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 200 (1995).
12 HENRI STIKER, A HISTORY OF DISABILITY (1995).
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those horrid mixtures as forcibly as possible by not confusing what pertains to 
mere social preoccupations and what pertains to the real nature of things.”13
Furthermore,  those  who  contest  over  the  delimitation  or  specificity  of 
disability, I argue, are part of a desire to drive down disability—thus ensuring 
that  this  class  of  enumerated persons  remains  problematically  as  a  state  of  
exceptionality,  defined  rather  than  being  figured  as  a  significant  part  of  a 
country’s population.  A state of exceptionality refuses to conceive of disability 
as  a form of difference that  is  inflected to different degrees throughout the 
population  and  as  a  conceptualization  that  is  spatially  and  historically 
contingent. The role of biomedicalism coupled with law’s regulative aspect can 
be  found  in  India’s  definition  of  disability  contained  in  the  Person  with 
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) 
Act, 1995 which reduces disability to diagnostic types:  § 2 (i) a “person with a 
disability”  to  “a  person suffering  from not  less  than  forty  per  cent  of  any 
disability as certified by a medical authority” (§ 2 (t)). And there you have it – 
laws enactment of purification zones that attempt to settle the matter by way of 
enumerative exactness and tend to any confusion by reducing disability to a 
medical model. Of course it is not hard to see that the motif of disability is 
much more than  a  state  of  being.  Nationalism demands that  the  archetypal 
normative citizen be free from flaws and matters of possible degeneracy. In 
these  times  of  economic  rationalism  and  panics  over  risk  and  terror,  the 
sentiments of famous U.S. eugenist case Buck v. Bell14 find new credence:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the 
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon 
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, 
often not felt  to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our 
being  swamped  with  incompetence.  It  is  better  for  all  the  world,  if 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them  starve  for  their  imbecility,  society  can  prevent  those  who  are 
manifestly  unfit  from continuing  their  kind.  … Three  generations  of 
imbeciles are enough. 
The  utilization  of  legal  remedies  by  disabled  people,  especially  after 
acquisition of impairment, occurs within a broader sociological context of an 
increasing  ‘culture  of  blame’,  where  the  disabled  litigant  responding to  the 
13 BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 100 (1993).
14 Carrie Buck v. James  Hendren Bell,  Superintendent  of  State Colony for Epileptics and 
Feeble Minded, 274 U.S. 200, 208.
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codification of injury is required to show that he has suffered.15 For example, 
when a court declares whether a disabled litigant conforms to a certain legal 
rendering of disability, the court has to first construct a narrative in which a 
character  (the  disabled  plaintiff)  is  faced  with  an  obstacle  or  conundrum 
(disability discrimination) posed by an antagonist (a disability discriminatory 
employer, for instance). In framing a disability discrimination case in this way, 
a court is assembling a set of circumstances into an intelligible whole, into a 
coherent  narrative  in  which  the  actions  and  events  are  endowed  with 
intentionality, meaning, and purpose.  
Indeed  the  whole  goal  of  legal  pleadings  is  context  reduction and 
reconstruction through the transmogrification of complex and often contrary 
realities in the lives of disabled people into coherent, factual ‘stock stories’. 
There are some aspects of non-conforming disability realities which are, so to 
speak, ‘zoned out’ because they dispute the seemingly coherent ontology of 
what a disabled person should be like. On occasion these outlaw realities of 
disability are subject to being governed and therefore regulated by absorption 
into anomalous zones. According to Razack, these anomalous zones are spaces 
that tolerate departures from norms and therefore are places where there is the 
possibility of norm subversion.16 Legal consciousness, combined with a matrix 
of  scientific  ableism (biomedicalism)  has  produced  a  fabricated  sense  of  a 
‘natural’ (albeit colonized) space where the juridical tentacles of the law are 
difficult to trace, let alone to assess what those fabricated ‘spaces’ enable. 
It is the claim of this paper that spatial realities within disability law, due to 
the  ontological  basis  of  spatiality,  have  produced  the  contours  of  disabled 
subjectivity.  This  subjectivity  in  turn  shapes  debates  about  the  purview  of 
citizenship, and about which impairments (and the degree thereof) are to be 
seen as ‘acceptable’ in advanced capitalist liberal nation-states. In contrast, in 
so-called ‘developing nations’,  there are  disputes  regarding the  best  way to 
discern the  field  of  not-disability  (i.e.  the  healthy comparator).  Without  the 
specifically  marked  space  of  the  disabled  person  where  human  corporeal 
differences are partitioned from each other, it would not have been possible to 
see the person who is ‘disabled’ (and who is not), to make visible the disabled 
gaze.  This  paper  has  an  investment  in  exploring  ‘interest  convergence’,  a 
15  See Wendy Brown,  Wounded Attachments:  Oppositional  Political  Formations  in Late  
Modern Democracy, 21 POL. THEORY (1993) [hereinafter Brown, 1993]; WENDY BROWN, STATES 
OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).
16 Sherene Razack,  Race, Space and Prostitution: the Making of the Bourgeois Subject  10 
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 357 (1998).
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concept developed by Derrick Bell to delineate situations where white people 
with power endure or foster black advancements only to the extent that these 
advancements promote white interests.17  Within the arena of the subordination 
of people of color, the US Supreme Court in the 1989 decision of Richmond v.  
Croson18 already revealed the limits of raced based interest convergence. Aside 
from  resorting  to  the  usual  technicist  approach  of  legal  formalism  in 
negotiating anti-discrimination law, the  Croson  decision significantly rewrote 
the landscape of racial spatiality. In that decision, the Court proclaimed that 
African-Americans had accomplished  racial equity with white people, and as a 
consequence of their ‘success’, African-Americans could no longer rely on a 
history of racial discrimination to argue for the maintenance and introduction 
of affirmative action programs. 
A critical disability studies perspective invites us to explore the limits of 
liberal  tolerance  of  disability  and  the  points  of  departure  away  from  the 
interests  of  ableism.  The  trend  in  courts  of  narrowing  the  definition  of 
disability by reframing disabled subjectivities and redrawing topographies of 
disablement in terms of mitigation has already occurred in the United States 
and  this  pattern  in  reading  disability  in  law is  likely  to  have  international 
implications.  Theresia  Degener  and  Gerard  Quinn  note  that  although  US 
Federal  law is  jurisdictionally  autonomous  from the  domestic  law of  other 
nation states, its flagship disability statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
1990 [hereinafter ADA], has become a template globally, to the extent “… that 
the  international  impact  of  this  law [the  ADA] is  larger  than  its  domestic 
effect”.19 Regardless  of  where  we  live,  the  mitigation  crisis  will  seek  to 
transform civic  understandings  of  disablement  as  provisional  and  tentative. 
This  trend  is  of  concern  when  the  tendency  towards  a  universalized 
codification of disability (norms) is on the increase.
III.  When  Law  Meets  Disability  –  Possibilities  and 
Dangers
17 CRITICAL RACE THEORY THE CUTTING EDGE (2nd edn., Richard Delgardo & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2000).
18 Richmond v.Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
19 Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn,  A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional  
Disability Law Reform,  paper presented at “From Principles to Practice”, An International 
Disability Law and Policy Symposium, October 22 – 26, 2000, Disability Rights Education 
and Defense Fund, available at http://www.dredf.org/synposium/degener1.html.
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Disability  studies  proceed  from  a  frame  which  figures  disability  as  a 
representational  system of  bodily  differences  and  not  a  medical  problem 
primed  with  tragedy.  Furthermore,  I  contend  that  the  production  and 
designation  of  the  neologism  ‘disability’  (especially  in  law)  cannot  occur 
outside  of  the  purview  of  the  processes  and  practices  of  ableism.  Legal 
reasoning is fundamentally ableist,  just as it  has been argued elsewhere that 
hegemonic  tropes of  legal  reasoning are  inherently  masculinist.20 Indeed,  as 
Rosemary Tong notes that increasing one’s understanding of the production of 
discrimination  in  general  is  best  done  by  becoming  knowledgeable  about 
discrimination against disabled people.  Disability, she argues, should become 
the paradigmic instance of discrimination.21 At the font of this disability bias is 
ableism. Ableism refers to 
a  network  of  beliefs,  processes  and practices  that  produces  a 
particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is 
projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential 
and fully human. Disability then, is cast as a diminished state of 
being human.22
For the notion of ableness to exist and to transmogrify into the benchmark 
subject  of  law,  normate  individuals  of  liberalism  must  have  a  constitutive 
outside – this individual must participate in a logic of supplementarity, or in 
other  words  act  as  a  fictive  comparator.   This  logic  of  supplementarity  is 
achieved through epistemologies of biomedicalism.  Law is uneasy with bodies 
that  ooze or  are  leaky,  especially  those  that  are  fat,  distressed,  sick,  dying, 
addicted  and  appear  impermanent.  These  demarcations  have  become 
increasingly relevant, as I will show later on in this paper when we look closer 
at the mitigation conundrum. 
Biomedicalism  which  assumes  that  impairment  has  an  existence  that  is 
accurate,  significant and  impartial,  altogether  independent  of  any  social 
context or discursive representation, has encroached on the psychic life of the 
disabled individual because it asserts that disability is internal, inaugurating a 
crisis  within  the  person’s  bodily  or  cerebral  self.  Disability  is  a  state  that 
warrants  medical  interventions,  curative  treatment  and  mitigation  of  the 
20 CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHERINE 
MACKINNON,  TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989);  MARTHA MINOW,  MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
21 Rosemary Tong, Dealing with Difference Justly: Perspectives on Disability, 25 SOC. THEORY 
& PRACTICE 519-530 (1999).
22 Kumari-Campbell, Legal Fiction, supra note 1 at  44.
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impairment  or  compensatory legal  remedies  wherever possible.  Medicine  in 
cooperation with law is brought in to assess the ‘damaged’ body by utilizing 
scaled enumerative scripts such as those typified by the Table of Maims whose 
fiction is legislated into existence. Law’s investment in biomedicalism invokes 
a  moral  landscape  wherein  the  unruly  body  is  culpable  (and  thus  held 
responsible) and the ‘real’ disabled body is innocent (and thus deserving legal 
protection).  Discourses  around  medical  research,  new  technologies  and 
practices contain implicit narratives of disability as a personal medical tragedy. 
This  theory  regards  the  existence  of  impairment  and  the  experience  of 
disability to be inherently negative. As Michael Oliver puts it: “disability is 
some  terrible  chance  event  which  occurs  at  random  to  unfortunate 
individuals”.23 Biomedical fabrications of ontologies of disability as tragic are 
policed by law which has the authorizing power to say what disability is and is  
not.   By  showing that  a  story  achieves  its  meaning and persuasiveness  by 
burying and discounting relevant facts and often by restricting and fixing the 
spatial scope of a narrative, dominant legal narratives fail to correspond with 
material reality.
Increasingly, legal regimes are utilized by disabled people to access greater 
resources and services to mitigate the effects of impairment, and as a vehicle 
for the monetary compensation of loss. Recent studies suggest the emergence 
of a paradox, wherein the application for disability benefits and compensation 
can  generate  feelings  of  despondency  as  the  disabled  person  engages  in  a 
process of altered perceptions and puts on the ‘clothes of a disabled identity’.24 
But for now, it is important to highlight the fact that the disabled litigant is 
required  to  ‘identify’  with  law’s  rendering  of  the  disabled  person  (for 
recognition and access) before even commencing the process of articulating a 
breach of rights and securing protective remedies.25 In the instance of disability, 
the litigant needs to draw on a wellspring of suffering (‘wounded attachments’) 
of grand proportions and like a parasite clasp the disabled litigant’s psyche into 
the future.  Under the ADA disabled people are viewed as a “discrete, insular 
23 MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 32 (1996).
24 G.  Holloway,  Susto  and  the  career  Path  of  the  Victim  of  an  Industrial  Accident:  A  
Sociological  case  study,  38(7)  SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 989-997 (1994);  N.  Sayer,  M. 
Spoont & D. Nelson, Veterans seeking disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder:  
who applies and the self-reported meaning of disability  compensation,  58  SOC.  SCIENCE & 
MED. 2133-2143 (2004).
25 I  am refreshed to see some exciting argument in this area by Laura Rovner,  see Laura 
Rovner,  Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2 UTAH L. REV. 
247 (2001). Also my own piece, Kumari-Campbell, Litigation Neurosis, supra note 1.
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minority”.26 This figuring is an example of an attempt to reinforce the belief in 
the fiction that  disability  is  exceptional rather than normative.   The  insular 
version of disablement also carries with it a negative connotation that Rovner 
argues is “hard wired into law”.27 
Figure 1: Shifts in legal performances of disability
Courts’ rendering of legal disability reflect the shifts in contested terrain 
about  the  ways disability  should be  known,  from the  theologically  inspired 
notion of the disabled sufferer who seeks to prove injury or harm at law, to the 
current ethos where increased corporatization of the welfare state emphasizes 
the trope of responsibilization: a good citizen is one who does the ‘right thing’ 
by mitigating an assumed burden associated with their impairment (See Figure 
1). Through the performance and enactment of disability subjectivities, legal 
discourses  play  a  critical  role  in  maintaining  the  structures  of  purification 
between  those  designated  as  ‘sick’,  ‘well’,  ‘deserving’  and  ‘undeserving’. 
Disabled peoples’ interactions with law necessitate that disabled performativity 
and  its  ensuing  subjectivities  are  iterated  in  accordance  with  discourses 
mediated within a norm of ableism. Maybe the spectacle of the disabled litigant 
acting out a part  in the court  would be amusing, a necessity instrumentally 
justified  to  achieve  a  remedy,  were  it  not  for  the  enduring  psychic 
consequences  of  such  a  drama.28  However,  I  wish  to  reiterate  that  the 
performances  of  disability  in  law  produces  subjectifying  discourses  where 
disabled subjects are brought into being, not just for ourselves, but for the rest 
of the population, inaugurating what can be said and what is unsayable about 
disability. It is important to not just look at what is confessed within discourse, 
26 Stacie Barhorst, What does Disability Mean: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
in the Aftermath of Sutton, Murphy,  and Albertsons, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 138-171, 139 (1999- 
2000).
27 Rovner, supra note 25, at 250.
28 See Kumari-Campbell, Legal Fiction, supra note 1. 
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in this case the trial judgments, but also whether there is a need to interrogate 
the silences.
Injury then,  and  its  companion  response:  mitigation  of  impairment,  has 
become  the  interpretative  lens,  the  trope,  from  which  to  speak  of  the 
experiences  of  impairment  and  its  performative  and  economic  impacts.  In 
short, the entry point of disability into law is through the doors of “deficiency” 
– an assumed deficiency in the body, merging into a deficiency in character. 
The  art  of  lawyering  is  a  process  that  involves  fictional  creations  of  truth, 
where as  Cain puts  it  “lawyers  are imaginative  traders  in words.  But these 
symbols traders are also creative. They invent categories and these categories 
constitute the practices and institutions within which their clients can achieve 
their objectives”.29 In so far as deficiency and the tragedy of impairment are 
assumed, liminality created by an ableist culture, and the ways law culturally 
mediates  difference  and  marginality  become  curtailed  and  hidden. The 
necessity  to  embrace  the  trope  of  suffering  binds  enactments  of  disabled 
subjectification into the perpetual  vortex that  signifies  disability  as  negative 
ontologically. The burden of negative formulations of disablement means that 
the litigant with disability would have difficulty if she wishes to present an 
affirmative approach to living with impairment colored with a mixture of joy 
and  despair.  Such  a  representation  is  in  opposition  to  dominant  cultural 
narratives  of  disablement  as  catastrophe  and  therefore  as  Rovner  observes, 
“law’s constraints make it  impossible for [those] stories … to be heard and 
recognized”.30 
In summary, the inscription of certain figurations of legal disability requires 
that  disabled  people’s  ‘experiences’  be  regulated  within  the  confines  of 
juridical  formations, which ultimately foreclose any alternative perspectives. 
Interestingly, the delimitation and marking of certain bodies as ‘disabled’ or 
‘injured’, bears little resemblance to varieties of self-referentiality attested to 
by people  with impairments  and is  ostensibly “imposed through policies  of 
repression  and  coercion”31.  Legal  rendering  of  disability  through  statutory 
definitions  and  case  law  can  produce  a  psychic  dissonance  between  those 
‘official’ imprimaturs and private realities.32 
29 Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders,in LAWYERS IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 33 (Maureen Cain 
and Mark Harrington. eds., 1994).
30 Rovner, supra note 25, at 277.
31 C.  Emecke,  Between Choice and Coercion: Identities,  Injuries,  and Different  Forms of  
Recognition, 7(4) CONSTELLATIONS 483-495 (2000).
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IV.  Mitigation  Compulsions or  “The  Most  Envenomed 
Serpents Admit Of Some Mitigation, And Will  Not Bite 
Their Benefactors”33
This section focuses at the philosophical level on the meaning of mitigation, 
in  particular  what  the  deployment  of  this  concept  says  about  the  status  of 
disability and the disabled person in civil society.  For illustrative purposes and 
to show that explanatory frameworks do inform judicial practice, I will survey 
legal reasoning around mitigation in a series of United States Federal Court 
decisions. 
i. Philosophical conversations
Philosophical  conversations  about  what  I  have  termed  mitigation 
compulsions attempt to discern a number of questions related to the quandary 
of impairment –such as, what does it mean to mitigate impairment? What is the 
justification for mitigation? And finally do people with disabilities have a duty 
to mitigate their impairment? In exploring these questions, I argue that it  is 
important to also think about how answers to these questions would differ (or 
not) if we were responding to the mitigation problem for people of color, gay 
men,  lesbians  and  women.  In  which  case,  what  difference  does  having  a 
disability  make  and  why  does  disability  make  a  difference?  Evolutions  in 
techno-science  continue  to  disrupt  the  fixity  of  defining  disability  and 
normalcy, especially within the arenas of law and bioethics. The borderlands of 
disability and the security of impassable crossings between the realities of able-
bodiedness and disablement, mean that such orderings are not just repressive, 
but  ultimately  productive:  they  tell  us  stories,  they  contain  narratives  as  to 
‘who’ we are and how we ‘should be’. In other words, as John Law rightly 
concludes: “ … ethics will derive from ontology. And ontology, what there is, 
is  being  made  at  least  in  part  in  narratives.”34 The  fact  is  that  hegemonic 
narratives of disablement undoubtedly assume that disability  qua disability is 
32 The self-understanding of impairment is very complex. It is not clear about the extent to 
which  individual  with  impairments  internalize  the  tragic  scripts  (known  as  internalized 
ableism) not refashion them as acts of resistance. See Kumari-Campbell, Legal fiction 2008, 
supra note 1 and Emcke, supra note 32.
33 JOSEPHUS, JEWISH ANTIQUITIES, xvii. v. §5
34 J.  Law,  Political  Philosophy  and  Disabled  Specificities  (draft)  (1999),  Department  of 
Sociology  and  Centre  for  Science  Studies,  Lancaster  University  available  at  
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc026jl.html.
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inherently  negative.  I  want  to  start,  rather  unusually  on  my  part,  with  a 
dictionary definition of the etymology of ‘mitigation’:
Mitigation: 1. Compassion, mercy, favour. Obs.
2a. The action of mitigating or moderating; the fact or condition 
of  being  mitigated;  an  instance  of  this;  spec.  abatement  or 
relaxation  of  the  severity  or  rigour  of  a  law,  penalty,  etc.; 
extenuation or palliation of an offence, fault, etc.; abatement or 
minimization of the loss or damage resulting from a wrongful act. 
in mitigation (Law): by way of extenuation or palliation (esp. of 
an  offence)  in  order  to  obtain  a  favourable  modification  (of 
judgment, a penalty, damages). 
b. Something that serves to mitigate; a mitigating circumstance or 
provision;  a  palliative.  Later  also  in  Criminal  Law:  mitigating 
circumstances  collectively,  esp.  presented  or  accepted  in 
extenuation of an offence.   
3. Prob.: a soothing remedy. Obs.  
4. Softening or qualification of wording, etc. Obs. 
5. Taming (of an animal). Obs.35.
At  the  outset,  ‘mitigation’  signals  a  desire  to  soothe,  to  make  mild  or 
gentle36 that  which  is  being  mitigated.  When  applying  such  sentiments  to 
disablement, the trope of soothing the suffering body under the guise of care 
and compassion comes to mind. Moving through the definition, phrases like 
“minimization of the loss or damage” appear through to “a palliative” (2b) and 
interestingly, in point 5, a “taming” of an animal. Does mitigation then, when it 
comes  down  to  it,  transcend  a  therapeutic  response  and  really  becomes  a 
strategy for taming the unruly disabled, possibly outlaw body?
The trope of restraint features highly in this liturgical/litigious play of the 
courtroom and in the arguments utilized in judgments. One development is a 
new way of classifying and portioning disability in law euphemistically termed 
‘elective’ or ‘voluntary’ disability, and has attracted the attention of some legal 
scholars.   Proponents  of  the  legal  concept  of  elective  disability  argue  that 
35 Oxford  English  Dictionary  Online  (2nd edn.,  1989)  available  online  at  
http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl.
36 The 1432 sense of the word is “make mild or gentle”, whilst “soft, mild” is attested to in the 
1362  understanding.  Online  Etymology  Dictionary,  available  online  at  
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mitigate.
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legislatures should distinguish between two categories of ‘disability’ when they 
make  assessments  for  coverage  (protection)  under  anti-discrimination 
legislation,  namely,  the  categories  of  immutable  and elective  (or  voluntary) 
disability.   As  these  legal  theorists  explain  it,  the  category  of  ‘immutable 
disability’ should apply to situations in which it is not possible (at least, not at 
present)  to  eliminate  the  disability  (where  this  term  usually  means 
‘impairment’).   Under  these  circumstances,  a  plaintiff  should  be  deemed 
innocent and, therefore, deserving.  Proponents of this bifurcation of disability 
argue,  furthermore,  that  the  category  of  ‘voluntary’  (‘elective’)  disability 
should, on the other hand, be used in situations where disabilities were caused, 
continue to exist, or have been worsened by individual ‘voluntary’ conduct.37  
The philosophical discussion of these proposed concepts is heavily laden 
with the language of moral judgment. I have selected text from the argument of 
Lisa Key. In an argument about the need to ensure the integrity of the ADA and 
to  maintain  public  support  for  that  statute,  she  remarks  that  extending 
protections to those people who she identifies as ‘’voluntarily disabled’ may 
result in “the loss of protection for those who are truly deserving”.38 In another 
hypothetical case of a janitor with a back injury who did not attend therapy, she 
states “[he] refused to help himself, while at the same time expecting others, … 
to bear the costs of accommodation”.39 No reason is proffered as to why the 
hypothetical janitor may not have attended therapy. Further into her argument, 
another hypothetical40 example of a man who sustained a spinal injury through 
the  ‘reckless’  behavior  of diving in  shallow water  without  first  checking is 
used.  Keys paints  a  picture  of an individual  who fails  to lift  more  than 30 
pounds in a rehabilitation program. She concludes: 
He is making an informed, conscious decision to continue living with the 
impairment. This is his prerogative. However, society should not be obligated 
to bear the cost of his choice.41
37 Elizabeth  Key,  Voluntary  Disabilities  and  the  ADA:  A  Reasonable  Interpretation  of  
'Reasonable Accommodation 48 HASTINGS L.J. 75-104 (1996); Bonnie Tucker, Deaf Culture,  
Cochlear Implants, and Elective Disability, 28 HASTINGS CENTRE REPORT 6-14 (1998).
38 Id, at 80.
39 Id, at 82.
40 It  is  interesting  the  use  of  ‘extreme’  hypothetical  examples  as  a  rhetorical  strategy to 
support an argument, which I argue serves to incite hostility towards disabled people who 
adopt ‘unpopular’ approaches to living with impairment  and generally distracts the reader 
from the core issues under consideration.
41 Elizabeth Key, supra note 37, at 84. For a more elaborate discussion of Keys argument see 
Fiona Campbell  2005a, supra note 1.
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The  perspective  of  Keys  reveals  the  anti-geographicalness  of  legal 
reasoning, a kind of reasoning which denies the reality of competing demands 
and intrudes into the lives of people with disabilities. These legal arguments 
occur  within  the  politico-juridical  context  that  disability  is  ontologically 
intolerable,  a  corporeal  state  that  slips  closely  towards  the  precipice  of  the 
human underbelly.  Further I contend that arguments such as those proposed by 
Tucker and Keys are underscored by the presupposition that disability is harm42 
and impairment is harmful to disabled people psychologically, spiritually and 
bodily and more particularly, that the existence of impairment is harmful to the 
order of the polis, particular economic life. 
The traumatic performance of disability at law institutes certain harms as 
“morally heinous in the law”.43 Such a compulsion delimits a specific site of 
blame by constituting certain legal subjects (and events) as responsible for the 
‘injury’ of social subordination of that other subject’s experience. What kinds 
of  ‘harm’  have  legitimacy  before  the  law?  Codification  of  case  law  has 
established  certain  authenticated  sites  and  specific  instances  of  ‘disability 
discrimination’ as harm. As I  have already mentioned,  what if  disability  as 
disability (in and of itself) is considered as a kind of harm?  I argue that harms 
that recite the tragic interiorization of disablement are acquiesced within legal 
discourses.  Emecke refers to this kind of unauthorized ‘harm’ as a moral injury 
of misrecognition where there is a “specific – mostly structural and permanent 
– discrepancy between one’s self understanding and the other’s description”.44  
Law’s  role  of  scaling  suffering  and  injury  according  to  biomedicalist 
perspectives can be contrasted with an alternative way of rendering suffering or 
more  specifically  ‘injury’.  Emecke  argues  that  ‘injury’  captures  those 
asymmetrical power relations between self-referentiality and external retort or 
perception,  in  this  instance in  the  reasoning and pronouncements  of  courts. 
This  conclusion  finds  support  in  the  writing  of  Laura  Rovner,  a  legal 
practitioner and academic who argues that under the ADA the disabled person 
carries the burden of proving that they have been harmed. In order to do so, she 
is required to adopt a victim identity, which may not only be in conflict with 
her own sense of self but reinforce the very negative figurings of disablement 
(as weak, passive, suffering victims) that the ADA purports to challenge.45 This 
42 One word for disability in French is ‘mal’ meaning ‘harm’.
43 Brown, 1993, supra note 15, at 27.
44 Emecke, supra note 31, at 484.
45 Rovner, supra note 25, at 252 – 253.
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negative clothing of disablement remains even after the litigation has ended 
and is difficult to shake off.46 In a rather bizarre outcome, the act of strategic 
essentialism,  (utilizing  labels  and  ontologies  of  tragedy  to  access  social 
benefits) which might initially seem commendable and might even be viewed 
as  an  act  of  subversive  resistance,  can  also  brings  into  itself  acts  of  ‘self-
degradation’, wherein passports of recognition (the limit-pointed identities of 
being a ‘disabled person’) become passports of unfreedom or anxiety. 
ii. Casing Disability
Contest  over  the  meaning  of  disability  under  the  Americans  with 
Disabilities Act, 1990 is exemplified in a series of cases brought in the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1999 known as the  mitigation trilogy,47 More recently, the 
High  Court  in  Australia,  in  Purvis v. New  South  Wales  (Department  of 
Education and Training)48 was asked to decide the definition (delimitation) of 
‘disability’ under the Disability Discrimination Act, 1992.  Disputes over the 
definition of ‘disability’ in disability discrimination cases under domestic laws 
are  more  often  than  not  about  broader  philosophical  issues  about  where  to 
‘draw a line in the sand’ about disability and non-disability. These disputes go 
to the heart of ‘dilemmas of difference’,49 and how archaeologies of difference 
are mapped. One thing that becomes clear in a number of ADA judgments is 
the  struggle  by judges to  deal  with the arbitrariness of  impairment.   In  the 
District  court  case  of  Lawson v.  CSX  Transportation50 this  conundrum  is 
brought to the foreground. The Court argued that should they fail to account for 
mitigating measures “all diabetics would be considered disabled …A diabetic 
whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities would therefore be 
considered disabled simply because he or she is diabetic”.51 Later, the judges 
exclaim that proposing to broaden the definition of major life activities “would 
46 Rovner, supra note 25, at 253; Also Kumari-Campbell, supra note 1, 2006, 2008.
47 Known as the ‘mitigation of disability cases’ the parameters of defining ‘disability’ under 
the  ADA have  been  realigned,  in  respect  to  ‘corrective  measures’  to  mitigate  ‘disabling 
conditions’:  Sutton v.  United Airlines Inc.,  527 US 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Service, 527 US 516 (1999); Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 US 555 (1999). I would 
argue in addition that the ‘disability’ concept is already occluded – as prong of the definition 
is tied to the notion of substantially limiting a major life activity’. §3 (2)(a) of the ADA.
48 (2003) 202 ALR 133.
49 See Minow, supra note 20, for a greater consideration of this issue.
50 101 F.Supp.2d 1089 (S.D.Ind.2000)
51 Id, at 1104.
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open  the  ADA  to  countless  potential  plaintiffs  who  have  innumerable 
conditions  that  cause  their  bodies  to  function  in  ways  outside  normal 
parameters,  notwithstanding  the  condition’s  impacts  on  the  plaintiffs’  daily 
activities”.52 Rather vividly, Justice Antonio Scalia in Murphy v. United Parcel 
Service is reported to have gestured in removing his glasses the dilemma of his 
‘sightlessness’  and  potential  inclusion  as  ‘disabled  ‘when  acting  without  a 
mitigating device.53
The juridical power of law and its capacity to name or erase different ways 
of framing disability were put to the test in a series of decisions that the U.S. 
Supreme Court handed down in 1999. There were three cases that altered the 
definition of disability under  Title 1 (Employment) of the ADA.  The central 
question in the trio of cases was whether disability should be measured in its 
‘untreated’ state,  or in light of any corrective measures that would give the 
appearance of normal functioning. In its examination of the meaning of the 
term ‘disability’ in the context of the ADA, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sutton 
held  that  the  terms  could  not  be  read  to  support  the  proposition  that 
determination  of  whether  a  person is  ‘disabled’  or  not  should  be  made  by 
evaluating  an  impairment  in  its  unmitigated  state”.54 To  the  contrary,  the 
majority judgment of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that:
if  a  person  is  taking  measures  to  correct  for,  or  mitigate,  a 
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures — 
both positive and negative — must be taken into account when 
judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major 
life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act.
The courts complicity in the semantic recuperation of what constitutes a 
mitigating measure may open a Pandora’s Box as various Courts’ attempt to 
discern the difference between compensatory measures and corrections. Stacie 
Barhorst concludes “…disabled persons who must mitigate their impairment to 
survive will have no recourse against an employer’s decision.”55 Returning to 
my earlier  dictionary definition of  mitigation,  we may wish to  reflect  upon 
52 Id. at 1103 – 1104.
53 David  Wasserman,  Stigma  without  Impairment:  Broadening  the  Scope  of  Disability  
Discrimination Law,  in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INSTITUTIONS 
AND INDIVIDUALS (Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000).
54 Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 US 471 (1999), 2146-2147, per O’Connor.
55 Barhorst, supra note 26, at 164.
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whether attempts at mitigating disability are really about taming the beast, the 
beast not of disability but of bodily difference.
What is interesting about these cases is that they illustrate some of the ways 
that technological applications mediate various discourses about the ontology 
of  disability  in  law,  and  in  attempting  to  mediate  disputes  over  disability 
discrimination  enact  discourses  that  traumatize  and  penalize  the  resistant 
impaired body through ableist partitioning.  They proceed from an assumption 
regarding the efficacy of mitigation and thus bypass any potential conundrums 
that problematize harms to the disabled person at an ontological or physical 
level.  Furthermore such ableist  strictures require the courts to potentially to 
anticipate “a person’s decision whether or not to pursue medical interventions 
[as well as evaluate the status of] an operation [that] would have ameliorated 
the  effects  of  an  impairment  but  was  rejected  as  too  risky”.56 Instead  of 
clarifying  (that  is,  securing)  the  meaning  of  disability  and  that  meaning’s 
relationship to the question of mitigation, the trilogy of cases (Sutton, Murphy, 
and  Albertson’s) have provoked a series of new questions with respect to the 
technological morphing of normalcy.  At stake is the rendering of the species-
typical body.  
The Court in all three cases concluded that individuals who ‘mitigate’ their 
impairments must have this factor considered when evaluation is made with 
respect to their coverage under the lawful ‘disability’ definitions of the ADA. 
However, none of those cases addressed the question of whether (as Key and 
Tucker  contend)  individuals  have  a  duty to  mitigate  impairment;  that  is,  if 
individuals ‘choose’ not to engage technologies (aids, prescriptions drugs, and 
so on) that seem to mitigate their impairments, should they still be considered 
disabled?  For example, should a woman without arms be required to wear a 
prosthesis or have a hand transplant in order to be considered ‘disabled’ under 
the ADA?  Whilst this line of argument was raised in the District Court case of 
Finical v.  Collection  Unlimited57,  it  was  soundly  rejected  by  the  Supreme 
56 Mayerson, A. & K. Mayer,  Defining Disability in the Aftermath of Sutton: Where Do We  
Go from Here? (2000), available at http://www.dredf.org/mayerson.html.
57 In one recent ADA case, the Arizona District  Court upheld a claim of ‘disability’  (and 
therefore  coverage  under  anti-discrimination  legislation)  irrespective  of  the  use  of 
compensating/mitigating measures such as prostheses. In Finical v. Collection Unlimited, 65 
F.  Supp 2d 1032 (1999),  the plaintiff  who was hearing impaired decided against  using a 
hearing aid on the basis that such a device picked up background noise and therefore was 
annoying.   The  defendants  argued  that  hearing  aids  should  be  included  as  a  mitigating 
measure. The court however held that an employee with a hearing impairment was disabled 
irrespective of their use of ‘hearing’ devices. 
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Court.58 We might extend these questions further in order to ask this question: 
will current (and future) morphing technologies contribute to the framing of a 
benchmark  mitigated  disabled  body59 which  is  used  to  assess  definitional 
conformity  irrespective  of  the  matter  of  usage  or  ‘choice’?   Will  today’s 
‘normal’ body be superseded, that is, become tomorrow’s ‘abnormal’ body? In 
the next and final section of this paper I will consider some of the implications 
that the re-spatialization of impairment as tentative or provisional disability has 
for citizenship.
V. Aftermaths: Disability as Provisional or Tentative
For constitutions … are like principles that claim to be general, to 
govern, to regulate. Despite the fact that they never did, this is no 
doubt  a  sometimes  useful  fiction.  One  we  will  hold  onto 
sometimes, perhaps even much of the time – but also one which 
we give up here and there in order to interfere and try to make 
specific differences to the arrangements of specific institutions.60 
… the ADA, as constructed by the current Court, can hardly be 
said to do much of  anything to protect  people with disabilities. 
Instead the Court’s activist interventionism has done a great deal 
to shield both private employers and public officials, in addition to 
denying the importance of past discrimination while preserving as 
much of the pre-ADA status quo as possible. The Court’s central 
message to people with disabilities seems to be, “Get over it”.61
In  Australia,  one  method  of  discouraging  full  entry  into  the  Australian 
community,  complete with full  rights  and responsibilities,  is  to give certain 
classes of immigrant’s temporary visas. Likewise, other classes of immigrants 
who are deemed to be acceptable as ‘new’ Australians have the opportunity to 
58 It is beyond the purview of this paper to explore associated argument that asks the Court to 
look at what a ‘similarly situated person’ would do?  An exploration of the type of person 
who would be deemed an appropriate comparator should be the subject of another paper.
59 One of the problems of operating within the duality of ‘abled’ and ‘disabled’ is that the 
boundaries  between  these  two  signifiers  interpenetrate.   The  rise  of  new  perfecting 
technologies  not  only  re-inscribes  ‘disability’;  in  addition,  the  ascendancy  of  these 
technologies re-inscribes ‘normalcy’ (construed as that which is species-typical).
60 Law, supra note 34. 
61 Aviam Soifer,  Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality  
Claims (Boston  College  Law  School  Working  Paper,  No  8,  2003),  available  at  
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=389400.
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avail  themselves  of  permanent  resident  status  or  indeed  to  become  a  full 
Australian citizen.  Keeping this motif in mind, disabled people, to a greater or 
lesser extent, are still busy articulating  entitlements to full citizenship status—
that is, having access to economic, political and cultural resources available to 
other classes of citizens. Australia’s particular brand of welfare liberalism is 
characterized by a  residual orientation primarily reliant on paid employment 
with a sharply targeted (restrictive) safety net of benefits for individuals who 
for  ‘no  fault  of  their  own’  are  not  in  the  paid  workforce.  The  residualist 
approach means that even those groups provided with assistance are positioned 
out-of-bounds  of  citizenry  –  they  are,  so  to  speak,  ‘remainders’, 
euphemistically labeled welfare recipients.  Patricia Harris provides a rather 
snappy  definition  of  what  she  terms  the  ‘moral-behavioral  dimension’  of 
welfare rationalities:
The  ‘moral-behavioural  dimension’  revolves  around  constructs 
such  as  responsibility,  independence,  motive  and  effort.  It 
embodies  governmental  evaluations  of  proper/improper  and 
responsible/ irresponsible behaviours, suggests how people ought 
to  behave,  and  sets  out  governmental  strategies  to  achieve  the 
desired ends.62
This paper has pointed to the emergence of conceptual and judicial realities 
that  err  towards  the  notion  of  mitigated  impairment  in  one  country  and  is 
already  having  various  ramifications  throughout  other  common  law 
jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada.  This is what has already happened. 
In this section of the paper I wish to move forward in time through temporal 
and  material  space  and speculate  what  could  happen,  should  the  notion  of 
mitigated impairment and its associated twin, tentative or provisional disability 
become mainstreamed within law and service provision.
As part of this paper’s focal concerns, there are two spatial faultlines that 
are  easy  to  miss  that  no  doubt  frequently,  but  silently,  coincide  and 
occasionally collide. The first faultline’s purview is jurisprudence and involves 
the  cause  of  action  and  scope  of  discrimination.  In  this  scenario  judicial 
reasoning oscillates between seeing discrimination in “a cut and dry manner …
anticipat[ing] all  possible scenarios and deciding which should be regulated 
and how” and the converse response, where discrimination is conceptualized as 
“…a problem of  human interaction that  is  fluid and constantly  manifesting 
62 Patricia  Harris,  From  Relief  to  Mutual  Obligation:  Welfare  Rationalities  and 
Unemployment in 20th-Centruy Australia, 37 J. SOC. 5-26, 6 (2001).
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itself in new forms such that we have no clear sense of all the circumstances in 
which it might arise in future or what to do about them”.63 The second faultline 
is specific to the theorization of disability within critical disability studies and 
the activist movement as a whole. Disability is viewed catachrestically, as an 
unstable,  spatially  and  historically  contingent  concept.  Yet,  rather 
paradoxically,  the  notion  of  disabled  people  as  a  protected  class  is  often 
engaged with strategically as “…a valid and unifying identity that reflects the 
real experiences and culture of a large group of people…”.64  In this paper I 
have  alluded  to  the  fact  that  the  American  Courts,  when  confronted  with 
knowledge about the fluidity of impairment and its potential unboundedness, 
have in recognition of this state of impairment, sought to make disability more 
workable by attempting to delimit impairment and make it fixed.
A  lack  of  acceptance  of  impairment  in  it’s  ‘untreatable  state’  and  the 
consequential  concept  of  disability  as  provisional  or  tentative  re-asserts  the 
belief that disability is inherently negative – a bodily order that is awaiting to 
be  expunged.  In  the  meantime,  the  mitigation  compulsion  leaves  disabled 
people with the sense that the only kind of impairment acceptable is one that is 
veiled or hidden. Passing becomes an esteemed attribute. As Kimberlyn Leary 
puts it: 
Passing occurs when there is perceived danger in disclosure. At 
its most extreme, it is a form of camouflage to sequester the self 
from expected trauma.  Its represents a form of self-protection 
that  nevertheless usually  disables,  and sometimes destroys,  the 
self it means to safeguard.65
The workings of internalized ableism by way of ‘passing’ are only possible 
when  viewed  more  broadly,  moving  away  from  a  focus  on  the  impaired 
individual to the arena of relationships. For it is in the interactivity with the 
norm (such as an ableized able-bodied person) that another form of erasure is 
required.  Ableist passing is not just about the person with impairment hiding 
their impairment or morphing their disability; ableism involves a failure to ask 
about  difference,  in  this  instance,  disability/impairment.  For  internalized 
63 Denise Réaume, Of Pigeonholes and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law, 
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ableism  to  occur  there  needs  to  be  an  existing  a  priori  presumption  of 
compulsory ableness (or at least the illusion or aspiration of). Such passing is 
about keeping the colonizer happy by not disturbing the peace, containing the 
matter that is potentially out of place. The veiling of impairment hides trauma: 
not the assumed trauma of disability, but where legal spaces are sites of trauma 
and the notion of disability jurisprudence is perceived as traumatic.
The  proposal  to  conceptualize  disability  as  tentative  or  provisional,  to 
assign  it  spatially  to  a  ‘temporary  zone’,  should  not  be  confused  with  the 
Jacques  Derrida’s  notion  of  deferability,  where  in  our  case  the  signifier 
disability  has  its  meaning  deferred  for  the  present,  still  impending  and 
awaiting.66 Instead, positioning disability as tentative conjures up the notion of 
disability  in  waiting,  disability  standing  in  reserve for  technologies  that 
imbricate use value, forming the productive body. Provisional spatialities of 
disablement have the potential to realign social planning way from a focus on 
‘care’ to that of ‘cure’. A shift away from the notion of permanence may mean 
that governments will become hesitant to invest in long-term service provision 
infrastructure  and  cordon  off  citizenship  rights  to  more  immutable,  thus 
protected classes in the population. The political and civil rights implications of 
these speculations are unimaginable – disabled people who wish to seek good 
fortunes are likely to feel compelled to resort to mitigation measures, lest they 
be prepared to feel the full weight of being assigned the label of having an 
outlaw disability. Hard to imagine – let us feel compelled to imagine so that we 
can be prepared to act!
In this paper, I have engaged with the insights of legal geographers who 
have pointed to a multiplicity of geographies all with myriad social, political 
and economic spaces.  Law’s  agents,  as  traders  in  symbols  have constituted 
such  phantom  spaces as  ‘voluntary  disability’,  ‘elective  disability’  and 
‘mitigated  impairment’.  A focus  on  these  fabricated,  isolated  and atomistic 
spaces of individualism has resulted in a shift away from examining the ways 
that the processes of ableism in tandem with the sites of law and technological 
create  spatial  divides,  impassible  crossings  between  the  borderlands  of 
disablement and normalcy. It is heartening to remind ourselves that corporeal 
spaces are in a constant process of rearrangement and because of this there is 
possibility  that  their  effect  will  be  conditional,  partial,  indeterminate  and 
hopefully  contestable.  In  the  meantime,  much  imagination  and  vigilance  is 
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required  to  ensure  the  possibilities  of  safe,  affirmative  homelands  of 
disablement.
